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Abstract
We construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making. Each industry
resides in one or more electoral districts; each district is represented by a legislator
in Congress; tari¤s are set by sequential bargaining à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be Pareto-worsening; legislators may
vote for bills that make their constituents worse o¤; identical industries receive very
di¤erent levels of tari¤. The results pose a challenge to empirical work: equilibrium
trade policy depends not only on economic fundamentals but also on political variables
at time of negotiations including random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies.
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1 Introduction
But to introduce a tari¤ bill into a congress or parliament is like throwing a
banana into a cage of monkeys. No sooner is it proposed to protect one industry
than all the industries that are capable of protection begin to screech and scramble
for it. They are, in fact, forced to do so, for to be left out of the encouraged ring
is necessarily to be discouraged.Henry George (1886).
Attempts by economists to understand the process of trade policy formation1 have evolved
from approaches based on electoral competition (Mayer, 1984), through lobbying (Findlay
and Wellisz, 1982) and inuence-peddling (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), to more recent
work focussed on the workings of legislative assemblies (such as Grossman and Helpman,
2005 and Willmann, 2004).
In this paper, we add an important element to the analysis: dynamic, non-cooperative
congressional bargaining. Models that focus on congressional decision making assume a
unied majority party writes and passes a bill, such as Grossman and Helpman (2005), or
that implicit cooperative congressional bargaining maximizes joint utility of representatives,
as in Willmann (2004). These approaches provide simplicity by clearing away by assumption
many of the features that make trade policy complicated in practice. By contrast, in the
model we propose here, in order to move tari¤s from the status quo, the member of the
Congress who can set the agenda must propose a trade bill and nd a majority coalition
willing to support it. In choosing how to vote, each member considers the uncertainty over
who will have agenda-setting power next, and thus over what tari¤ bill will emerge down
the road if the current bill fails. In this setting, a number of features emerge that are quite
di¤erent from what other models o¤er:
(i) The trade policy that emerges will depend on which member of the Congress has
agenda-setting power, apart from the fundamentals generally accounted for in empirical
1There is an extensive literature on trade policy formation; see Rodrik (1995) and Nelson (1999) for a
review.
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work both economic fundamentals (industry size, elasticities of demand, and so on) and
institutional fundamentals (political organization of the industry). Indeed, since omnibus
trade bills are passed infrequently, this implies that, at any given date, the structure of tari¤s
across industries can be largely the result of who chaired what committee, for no matter how
brief a period, many years ago.
(ii) The equilibrium of the bargaining game is typically in mixed strategies (at least
in the case with patient legislators). Conditional on fundamentals and the identity of the
agenda-setter, the outcome is random because the agenda setter chooses randomly between
industries to attract to the winning coalition. The randomness of this choice is a deep feature
of the model that results from the dynamic nature of the game specically, the possibility of
multiple rounds of bargaining after the current round if no bill passes; a static game would
have no reason for randomness. As a result, even conditional on fundamentals and also
on the identity of congressional leadership at the time of the bills passage, empirical work
explaining the determinants of tari¤s might need to control for the identity of the winning
coalition, perhaps proxied by the members who voted in favor.
(iii) Because of the uncertainty about the future agenda setter and future proposals that
will come to the table, in many cases a member of the Congress will vote for a bill that is
worse for her constituents than the status quo. Again, this is a feature of the dynamic nature
of the model and would disappear in a static version.
Empirical Applicability. Our contribution is to clarify the logical implications of con-
gressional bargaining in the context of trade policy, and how they are distinct from unitary
decision making or a static congressional model. This is a theoretical, not an empirical,
contribution. However, this theoretical exercise can be useful in interpreting the real world
of trade-policy setting in a number of ways. First, directly, it can help understand some of
the dynamics of trade policy setting in countries and times in which trade policy is set by
assemblies with agenda-setting power that changes over time. Second, indirectly, it can help
understand incentives for legislatures to create institutions, such as international agreements,
delegation of trade-policy authority, and the like, to avoid such congressional bargaining. We
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comment on direct applicability below, while we defer the discussion of indirect applicability
to the Conclusion section.
For examples of the direct applicability of the model, we can examine cases of countries
whose legislatures have not delegated trade policy setting either to an executive or to an
international agreement, for example, the US before Congress routinely delegated trade au-
thority to the executive branch through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 or
the later Fast Track Authority. Given this interpretation, the key elements of the model can
be seen in the rough and tumble of trade-bill formation in historical practice. Consider the
1880s in the United States, a period in which trade policy was perhaps the most contentious
and vigorously debated issue of the day and the issue on which at least one national election
was decided. Consider four central elements to our story, each of which requires a dynamic
model. (i) Uncertainty about the agenda setter. The main agenda setter in the US House
of Representatives for trade bills is the chair of the Ways and Means Committee, appointed
by the Speaker of the House. In 1883, the Speaker was Samuel Randall, a Democrat from
Pennsylvania, an ardent protectionist allied with iron and other industries of his home state.
He was challenged in that year for the position of Speaker by John Carlisle of Kentucky, a
Democrat from a rural area committed to much lower tari¤s all around. The battle for the
chairmanship was intense, and Carlisle surprised everyone by pulling an upset victory (Tar-
bell, 1911, p. 137). Carlisle appointed a moderate free-trader, William Morrison of Illinois,
to the Chairmanship of Ways and Means. Later, the agenda-setter changed unpredictably
once again, when Morrison in 1886 lost his re-election campaign and was replaced at Ways
and Means by a stauncher free trader, Roger Mills of Texas (Tarbell, 1911, p. 155). The
agenda-setter changed more dramatically in 1888, when Republicans won a majority in the
House, and staunch protectionists seized control from the ardent free traders. Thus, in just
a few years, the agenda-setting power changed hands several times, among politicians with
very di¤erent policy preferences. (ii) The proposed trade bill changes dramatically with the
identity of the agenda setter. Several di¤erent trade bills were proposed during this period,
and the proposed bills changed character rapidly with changes in the agenda setter. For
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example, the Mills bill of 1888 lowered tari¤s across the board, while the McKinley tari¤ bill
passed by the new Republican house in 1890 raised tari¤s sharply for almost every industry
(Tarbell, 1911, pp. 188-206). (iii) The coalition supporting a proposed bill does not depend
merely on party, but on the contents of the bill. Randall, for example, had built a coalition
of supporters for his protectionist agenda that included a wide range of Republicans and a
number of Democrats willing to buck their partys dominant free-trade ideology (Tarbell,
1911, p. 137). (iv) Members of the Congress vote strategically, sometimes voting for a pro-
posal that will make things worse for their constituents, because they are concerned that the
next proposal might be even worse. This can be seen in the decision by Randalls supporters
in the House to support the Mills tari¤ reduction bill with heavy heartsas likely the best
they could obtain, although it reduced tari¤s rather than raised them as their constituents
desired (Tarbell, 1911, pp. 164-165).2
The model in more detail. We consider a small open economy that accommodates four
industries, one that produces numeraire homogeneous good using labor alone and three
manufacturing industries that employ sector-specic capital alone. There are N electoral
districts (constituencies), each of which hosts one manufacturing industry along with the
numeraire good industry. Individuals who reside in the same district are identical and each
one is endowed with one unit of labor and one unit of capital to be used in the manufacturing
industry located in that district. As a result, there is a potential conict among districts
based on (manufacturing) industry attachment.3
Each district is represented by a legislator in the legislature (Congress). Each legislator
cares only about the welfare of her own district, and the welfare of a district is closely related
to the industry located in it. In our model, trade policy implies any tari¤ or subsidy levied
on any sectors output.4 This setup is consistent with distributive politics since an increase
2Examples from other countries can be found in our working paper Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2011).
3Magee (1978), in his study of testimony on trade legislation, nds strong evidence for sector-based
political activity. Moreover, in other studies, capital and labor are found to be relatively immobile over
politically plausible time horizons; see Nelson (2007), footnote 4.
4Here, we use tari¤s as a measure of protection. In reality, non-tari¤ barriers (NTBs) are also used and
are very closely related to tari¤s as documented by Ray (1981) and Marvel and Ray (1983).
4
in the price of a particular good (say, due to protection) will be benecial only to those
districts that produce it, but will be costly to the whole economy due to its negative e¤ect
on consumption.
We analyze the legislative game as a sequential model of multilateral bargaining with
a simple majority rule à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). This approach to congressional
bargaining has borne much fruit in the political economy of public nance (see, among
others, Baron, 1993; Primo, 2006 and Battaglini and Coate, 2007), but to our knowledge it
has not yet been used to analyze trade policy. Each period, a legislator is selected randomly
to propose a tari¤ bill.5 To pass a bill, the proposer must create a coalition of supporting
legislators large enough to form a majority, in which case the bill goes into e¤ect and the
legislature adjourns. Otherwise, the status quo trade policy prevails and the process is
repeated with a new legislator (possibly the same as in the previous period). In her voting, a
legislator compares the benets accruing to her district from the current proposal to the value
of continuing to the next stage. As is common in this type of multi-member bargaining games,
there are many subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) that can be supported with innitely-nested
punishment strategies. Therefore, following the literature, we focus on stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium (SSPE). Stationarity is a restrictive assumption such that it can even
eliminate the e¢ cient equilibrium; we will discuss stationarity and equilibrium selection in
Section 3 and Section 4.
A closer look at our ndings yields the following observations. We focus here on the
case of patient legislators, which we will argue is more realistic (see in particular footnote
18), although we also treat the case of impatient legislators in the main text. First, the
ex ante expected benet an industry receives from congressional bargaining is a¤ected by
the industrys dispersion (i.e., the number of electoral districts an industry operates in). To
focus on the pure dispersion e¤ect, consider the thought experiment in which each industry
5Random recognition is a convenient way to model the uncertainty that legislators face, i.e., they do not
know exactly which coalitions will form in the future if the current coalition fails to enact the legislation.
Although the purely random selection is of course an abstraction, the uncertainty regarding the agenda
setter is important in practice, as illustrated by the historical example discussed above, and this convenient
abstraction is used in an enormous literature following Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
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produces the same output, but they di¤er in the number of districts in which they operate.
We show rst that, independent of other factors, trade protection is higher for industry i
than industry j if industry i representatives constitute a majority in the Congress. This
makes sense; if an industry is dispersed enough to have a majority representation in the
Congress, then it will receive more protection due to its agenda-setting power.
However, we show that if no industry has a majority in the Congress, more disperse
industries have no advantage ex ante over less disperse industries. The reason is that a more
disperse industry has a better chance of holding agenda-setting power (since it controls more
seats), and so it can drive a harder bargain when it is in a coalition. Consequently, when
it is not the agenda setter, it has a much lower probability of being included in a coalition.
This is a subtlety that as far as we know has not been investigated in empirical work.
Second, in case no industry has majority representation in the Congress, the ex ante
expected benet an industry receives from Congressional bargaining is determined by that
industrys total output. In particular, larger industries that produce more output tend to
benet less from congressional negotiations over tari¤s than smaller industries. The reason
is that such an industry will generate fewer imports (since it will satisfy more of domestic
demand from domestic production), and so the tari¤ revenue produced by a given tari¤ will
be small; but this means that if a large industry is a member of the coalition that forms the
tari¤ bill, the coalition partner will receive little benet from a tari¤ on the large industry,
and so will be unwilling to agree to a high tari¤.
Third, in addition to these factors, the status quo tari¤s also matter.6 In particular, if
the initial protection for an industry is already high compared to other industries, then there
is less room for that industry to improve over its status quo welfare since it is closer to its
ideal protection level than others.
This paper draws on a number of related contributions. Obviously, we have derived the
overall bargaining structure from Baron and Ferejohn (1989), which appears not to have been
6The status quo tari¤s matter for welfare e¤ects even though in the limiting case where the members
of the Congress are very patient, they do not matter for the nal levels of tari¤s. The e¤ect of historical
patterns of protection on current protection is documented by Lavergne (1983) and Ray and Marvel (1984).
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used in international economics previously. It should be emphasized, however, that extending
their model of pure distribution to trade policy is not straightforward. Distortionary trade
policy a¤ects not only the division of the pie, but the size of the pie, and indeed we will
see that payo¤s are concave in the tari¤s, so the randomization created by congressional
bargaining tends to reduce welfare for all. In addition, considerable complexity is created
by the presence of a non-trivial status quo (given by trade with initial tari¤s, which may
di¤er across industries), unlike in the original models. We are able to show that in the limit
with very patient players (but only in the limit) these status quo tari¤s do not matter for
the outcome.
Our model is also closely related to Willmann (2004), McLaren and Karabay (2004) and
Grossman and Helpman (2005). Willmann (2004) models the trade policy determination as
a joint welfare maximization of all legislators whereas Grossman and Helpman (2005) model
it as a joint welfare maximization of majority party legislators. On the other hand, McLaren
and Karabay (2004) employ an election framework in which trade policy is predetermined.
The common property of all of these papers is that there is not much scope for legislative
procedures. In contrast, non-cooperative legislative bargaining is the core force behind trade
policy formation in our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic
model. In Section 3, equilibrium is characterized. We discuss possible extensions in Section
4. Section 5 concludes the analysis.
2 Model
Consider a small open economy populated with a unit measure of individuals living in N
districts (where N > 3 and divisible by 3). There are M = 4 industries: one that supplies
a homogeneous numeraire good (good 0) produced with labor alone, and three others, each
of which supplies a homogenous manufacturing good (good i, where i = 1; 2; 3) produced
with sector-specic capital alone. In particular, we assume that the production technology
for good 0 yields 1 unit of output per unit of labor input, and the technology for each
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manufacturing good takes the following form: fi(Ki) = Ki, where Ki and  denote the
amount of the sector-specic capital used in sector i and the economy-wide productivity
parameter, respectively.
Each district is composed of a homogeneous population; each individual residing in a
given district is endowed with one unit of labor and also one unit of the same type of sector-
specic capital. Let the number of districts producing good i be denoted by ni such that
n1 + n2 + n3 = N . Without loss of generality, we assume that n1  n2  n3. Districts that
produce the same manufacturing good are populated by the same number of individuals. To
save on notation, we let Ki denote both the total amount of type-i capital in a type-i district
and the total number of individuals residing in a type-i district. Given that the population
is of unit mass,
3P
i=1
niKi = 1. Let qi denote the amount of good i produced in a district
that hosts industry i, and Qi denote the total amount of good i produced in the economy.
Therefore, we have qi = Ki and Qi = niqi.7 This implies that
3P
i=1
Qi = 
3P
i=1
niKi = . In
addition, let pi and pi represent, respectively, the exogenous world price of good i and its
domestic price. On the other hand, the numeraire good, good 0, has a world and domestic
price equal to 1 (see footnote 11). Thus, the total rent that accrues to capital in district i is
piqi = piKi, and the total labor income earned in district i is Ki.
Each individual has an identical, additively separable quasi-linear utility function given
by
u = c0 +
3X
i=1
ui (ci) ,
where c0 is the consumption of good 0 and ci represents the consumption of good i = 1; 2; 3.
We assume that ui (ci) = Rici   (c2i =2), where Ri > 0 and assumed to be su¢ ciently large.8
With these preferences, the domestic demand for good i, implicitly dened by u0i (d(pi)) = pi,
is given by d(pi) = Ri  pi. The linearity of demand is not crucial for the main results of our
7To make things simple and analytically tractable, aggregate output of each industry is perfectly inelastic
in our setup. There is also some evidence that supply elasticities tend to be quite low in practice; see Marquez
(1990) and Gagnon (2003). We conjecture that if supply could respond to price in each industry, equilibrium
tari¤s in each industry would be lower ceteris paribus for industries with a more elastic supply response.
8To be more precise, we require Ri > pi +   Qi for all i = 1; 2; 3. This ensures that demand for good
i is positive at all prices that may occur in legislative bargaining. We also require pi > Qi for each price to
be positive. See Section 3 for the determination of optimal tari¤s (hence optimal prices).
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paper, but it simplies the analysis and permits a closed-form solution. The indirect utility
of an individual with income y is y + s (p), where p = (p1; p2; p3) is the vector of domestic
prices,9 and s (p) =
P3
i=1 [ui (d(pi))  pid(pi)] is the resulting consumer surplus.
Each district is represented by a single legislator who is concerned only with the welfare
of her own district. A districts welfare is the aggregate utility of all individuals in that
district, which is equal to the total income plus the districts share in total consumer surplus
and total tari¤ revenue (or subsidy cost) for each good. Hence, we can express the total
welfare of a district that produces good i as (for i 6= j 6= k)
Wi(p) = Ki + piKi +Ki
X
l=i;j;k
(Rl   pl)2
2
+Ki
X
l=i;j;k
[(pl   pl ) (Rl   pl  Ql)] , (1)
where the rst term is the districts labor income (equal to one unit of good 0 output per
person), the second term is the capital rent, the third term is the consumer surplus captured
by that district (recall thatKi also represents the population share of a district that produces
good i), and the last term is its share of tari¤ revenue (or subsidy cost).10 In addition, we
denote wi(p) as the welfare of an individual with a stake in industry i, hence
wi(p) = 1 + pi +
X
l=i;j;k
(Rl   pl)2
2
+
X
l=i;j;k
[(pl   pl ) (Rl   pl  Ql)] . (2)
Before proceeding with the other details of our model, we would like to clarify the partic-
ular ways in which we use index letters to refer to industries. Unless specied otherwise, we
use the index letters (i; j; k) only for the manufacturing goods. Moreover, when used in the
same statement, each one of (i; j; k) refers to a distinct manufacturing good, so i 6= j 6= k.
If we want to refer to a particular one of (i; j; k), then we will commonly say industry
l 2 fi; j; kg, and when necessary, industry m 6= l. The working of most of these can be seen
in the per capita welfare function given above in equation (2).
Now, to continue with the model, we consider an innite-horizon model. Every period,
there is a set of prices at which individuals make their production and consumption decisions,
9We restrict the domestic price of good i to satisfy: 0  pi < pi, where pi = pi + (Ri p

i )
2+( Qi)2
2( Qi) . These
limits ensure that we get an interior solution in prices.
10We assume that tari¤ revenue (or subsidy cost) is distributed equally as a lump-sum transfer to each
individual.
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and enjoy the resulting welfare. The legislature can change the prevailing status quo, ps =
(ps1; p
s
2; p
s
3), by changing the domestic price of any good via legislative bargaining. We restrict
the set of policy instruments available to the legislature and allow only for trade taxes and
subsidies. A domestic price in excess of the world price implies an import tari¤ for an
import good and an export subsidy for an export good. Domestic prices below world prices
correspond to import subsidies and export taxes.11
The timing of the trade policy formation game in our model is based on the Baron-
Ferejohn bargaining framework. This is a game of complete information. At the start of each
period (before any production or consumption takes place),12 a legislator is selected randomly
(with equal probability for each legislator) to propose a tari¤vector.13 If the proposal receives
a simple majority, it is immediately implemented and the legislature adjourns. Each districts
welfare thereafter is evaluated at the new prices.14 If the proposal does not receive a majority,
the process is repeated with another legislator (possibly the same as in the previous period) to
propose a new tari¤ bill. Bargaining continues until a bill is implemented.Districts continue
to receive their status quo welfare in every period until an agreement is reached.
There are a couple of things to note. First, it is straightforward to show that the aggregate
welfare, W (p) =
P3
i=1 niWi(p), is maximized at the free trade prices of the three goods.
Hence, if the prices were set by a central authority (such as a President), free trade would
prevail forever. Second, from equation (1), a manufacturing good a¤ects (through its price) a
districts welfare via three channels. The rst one, the rent that accrues to the specic factor,
is present if that good is produced in that district. The second one is the consumer surplus
attained from the consumption of that good. The last one is the tari¤ revenue (or subsidy
11Without loss of generality, we assume that the tari¤/subsidy on good 0 is equal to 0. Any tari¤ vector
 0 yielding domestic prices p0 = p +  0 with  00 6= 0 can be replaced by  00  1p00 [
0    00p] yielding
p00 = p +  00 without changing relative prices or any real values. Given that good 0 is the numeraire, this
implies that p000 = p

0 = 1.
12To simplify, we assume that a period in the legislative game coincides with a production/consumption
period.
13Therefore, the probability that the proposer represents industry i is equal to niN .
14Note that once a proposal is accepted, the game ends so that there will be no future proposals. In
practice, there is an opportunity cost to a legislatures time, and after a major trade bill is passed there is
likely to be public pressure to move on to other issues for a considerable period of time before trade policy
is once again placed on the legislative agenda. We discuss how to relax this assumption in Section 4.
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cost) due to trade. The e¤ect of price through the rst channel is always positive whereas
it is always negative through the second channel. Its e¤ect through the third channel, on
the other hand, can be positive or negative (in fact the third channel is concave in all three
prices).
For the remainder of the analysis, we let  = ( 1;  2;  3), where  i = pi   pi . Therefore,
we can rewrite equation (2) as
wi( ) = 1 + (p

i +  i) +
X
l=i;j;k
(Rl   pl    l)2
2
+
X
l=i;j;k
 l (Rl   pl    l  Ql) . (3)
Notice that, given our parameter restrictions (see footnotes 8 and 9), the per capita welfare
function given in equation (3) is concave in tari¤s.
Also, let  s = ( s1; 
s
2; 
s
3) describe the vector of status quo trade taxes (or subsidies). It
will prove helpful to write down the per capita welfare change from the status quo when the
Congress agrees on a tari¤ bill  . To do so, simply evaluate equation (3) at  =  s and
subtract it from wi( ), which leads to
wi( )  wi( s) = ( i    si ) 
1
2
X
l=i;j;k

( l +Ql)
2   ( sl +Ql)2

. (4)
The rst term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is the per capita change in capital
rent while the second term indicates the per capita change in consumer surplus plus tari¤
revenue.
The rst-best for each legislator is to maximize her districts welfare without any con-
straints. For a legislator representing industry i, let Ui denote the vector of trade taxes that
the unconstrained maximization problem leads to, i.e., Ui = argmax

wi( ). Maximizing
equation (4) with respect to  i,  j and  k yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Unconstrained maximization of wi( ), i = 1; 2; 3, yields (for i 6= j 6= k)
Uii =   Qi,
Uij =  Qj,
Uik =  Qk.
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Thus, a recognized (selected) legislator would ideally demand an import tari¤ (or an
export subsidy) for the good her district produces (thereby protecting that industry) whereas
an import subsidy (or an export tax) for the other goods.15 Moreover, a producer in a sector
that produces higher aggregate output Qi will prefer a lower tari¤ (or export subsidy) for her
own product than a producer in a sector that produces lower aggregate output. The reason
is as follows. Focus for now on the case of an imported good. Recall the three channels
discussed before through which the price of good i a¤ects the per capita welfare of producers
in industry i. Aggregate output, Qi, in this case does not a¤ect the rst two channels (the
rent and consumer surplus channels of course, a higher Qi implies higher total rent, but
not higher rent per capital owner in industry i). What it does a¤ect is the third channel,
tari¤ revenue. A higher value for Qi implies a weaker tari¤ revenue e¤ect since, at a given
price and the other parameters, a higher value of Qi implies fewer imports, hence a lower
marginal tari¤ revenue for a given increase in tari¤.16 Therefore, a higher value of Qi implies
a lower marginal benet of the tari¤, and a lower optimal tari¤, from the point of view of a
sector-i producer. Parallel reasoning holds for an exported good.
It is natural to assume that the status quo prices are in the range dened by the un-
constrained maximization problem. For example, a legislator representing a district that
produces good i has no reason to set  i above    Qi. Similarly, she has no reason to set
 j 6=i below  Qj. Hence, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The status quo prices satisfy the following:  Ql   sl = psl   pl    Ql,
for l = 1; 2; 3.
Hence, a value of  si =    Qi corresponds to the case in which the status-quo tari¤ of
good i is at its optimum for the districts that produce good i, while  si =  Qi corresponds
15Since Q1 +Q2 +Q3 = ,   Qi > 0 for all manufacturing goods.
16The same conclusion holds for a comparison between two industries i and j even if, although Qi > Qj ,
the demand parameter Ri is su¢ ciently higher than Rj that at a common tari¤, imports of good i exceed
those of good j. The reason is that an increase in Ri, holding all prices and other parameters constant,
raises industry i imports, increasing the marginal tari¤ revenue from the tari¤ on good i, but at the same
time raises domestic consumption of good i, raising the marginal consumer surplus loss from the tari¤ on
good i. The two e¤ects cancel each other out, with the result that the demand parameters Ri have no e¤ect
on tari¤ preferences.
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to the case in which it is at its optimum for the districts that produce good j 6= i.
We can also write the ex post change in per capita payo¤s by plugging the tari¤s given
in Lemma 1 into equation (4)
wi(
Ui)  wi( s) =  [(  Qi)   si ] 
2  Pl=i;j;k ( sl +Ql)2
2
,
(5)
wm(
Ui)  wm( s) =   [Qm +  sm] 
2  Pl=i;j;k ( sl +Ql)2
2
, for m = j; k.
For a given value of  and given Assumption 1, it is clear from these expressions that the
per capita welfare change each industry obtains positively depends on its own tari¤ and
negatively on other two tari¤s, regardless of which industrys rst-best we are in. In other
words, wl(Ui) wl( s) is decreasing in  sl and increasing in  sm6=l for l;m 2 fi; j; kg. For an
individual who has a stake in industry l, a low value of  sl corresponds to the case in which
the status quo tari¤ for good l is signicantly di¤erent than its optimum value, and hence,
there is room for welfare improvement. As  sl increases, the potential welfare gain via the
change in the price of good l gradually diminishes and reaches zero when  sl =   Ql. This
is the case in which the status quo tari¤ for good l is already at its optimum for industry
l agents. A parallel argument can be made for  sm6=l. For an individual who has a stake in
industry l, a high value of  sm6=l means that there is a big room for welfare improvement by
lowering the price of good m. As  sm6=l goes down, the potential improvement via the change
in the price of good m becomes lower and reaches zero when  sm6=l =  Qm. Again, this is the
case when the status quo tari¤ for good m is already at its optimum for industry l agents.
Furthermore, wl(Ui)   wl( s) is decreasing in Ql and increasing in Qm6=l for l;m 2
fi; j; kg. As stated before, aggregate output of each industry a¤ects individual welfare via
the third channel, namely the tari¤ revenue e¤ect. We know from Lemma 1 that each
individual prefers a price above the world price for the good in which she has a direct stake
and a price below the world price for the other goods. Consider imported goods for the
moment. This implies that each individual receives a tari¤ revenue for its own industrys
good and incurs a subsidy cost for other goods. A higher value of Ql (Qm6=l) implies fewer
13
imports, hence a lower tari¤ revenue (subsidy cost). A similar reasoning holds for exported
goods.
Moreover, in light of the assumed range for the status quo tari¤s, it is possible to rank the
welfare change from the best to worst across individuals with stakes in di¤erent industries.
Note that, for a given  sj and 
s
k, wi(
Ui)   wi( s) attains its minimum at  si =    Qi.
Evaluated at this value, wi(Ui) wi( s) = (
s
j+Qj)
2
+(sk+Qk)
2
2
> 0, so there is always a welfare
gain for individuals who have a stake in industry i.17 On the other hand, for individuals
associated with industries j and k, whether there is a welfare gain or loss depends on the
values of  sl , 8l. Given that  Ql   sl   Ql, it is easy to see that the maximum value of
wj(
Ui)  wj( s) + wk(Ui)  wk( s)

is zero, implying that at least one of the two must
be negative (except for when ( si ; 
s
j ; 
s
k) = ( Qi;  Qj;  Qk) or ( Qi; Qj; Qk), in
which case both of them are zero). Moreover, if  sj +Qj > 
s
k+Qk, then wj(
Ui) wj( s) <
wk(
Ui)  wk( s) (and vice versa). However, per capita welfare gain accruing to industry i
is at least as much as any possible welfare gain accruing to other industries. This is due to
the agenda-setting power of the legislators representing industry i.
3 Characterization of equilibrium
In this section, we will initially investigate the properties of the bargaining outcome. Next,
we will focus on two scenarios. First, as a benchmark, we will assume that the legislators
are very impatient such that their common discount factor (denoted by ) approaches 0 in
the limit. After that, we will consider the opposite scenario in which legislators are very
patient so that  approaches 1 in the limit. The former scenario will show us the equilibrium
under the static game whereas the latter scenario will show us the equilibrium under the
dynamic game. Later, in Section 4, we discuss the case of intermediate values of . Which
value of  is most realistic is an empirical question; however, if we interpret a periodto
be a congressional term (which is two years in the US context), then the most natural
17When  si =    Qi,  sj =  Qj and  sk =  Qk, the status quo tari¤s coincide with the optimal tari¤s;
i.e.,  s = Ui . In this case, the welfare change will be zero.
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interpretation of  is the re-election rate for a typical member. Since re-election rates tend
to be quite high, this interpretation argues for a high value for  as more realistic than a low
one.18
As common in multi-person bargaining problems, there are many subgame perfect equi-
libria (SPE) in this game.19 We focus on stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE)
whereby the continuation payo¤s for each structurally equivalent subgame are the same.20
In a stationary equilibrium, a legislator who is recognized to make a proposal in any two
di¤erent sessions behaves the same way in both sessions (in the case of a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, this means choosing the same probability distribution over o¤ers). Hence, sta-
tionary equilibria are history-independent.
Let the per-period equilibrium welfare of a district producing good i, evaluated at the
beginning of a period, before the proposer has been selected, be denoted as Vi. This is also the
per-period equilibrium welfare (net of status quo welfare) a district expects in the following
period in the event that the period ends without a bill passed, and so loosely speaking, we will
also call it the continuation payo¤. Since a random proposer is selected every period, the
outcome of legislative bargaining depends on the identity of the proposer. In this sense, the
outcome is ex ante uncertain. Hence, we use the ex ante expected per-person welfare change
due to bargaining as the basis for comparison among individuals with stakes in di¤erent
sectors. To this purpose, let vi denote the continuation payo¤ of an individual with a stake
in industry i, thus vi = ViKi .
When a legislator is recognized to make a proposal, she has an incentive to propose a tari¤
bill that will be accepted, since if rejected, she faces the risk that her district might be worse
o¤ with a bill adopted in the future. In equilibrium, in accordance with the Rikers (1962)
18According to gures from OpenSecrets.org, from 1964 to 2010 the average re-election rate for members
of the US House of Representatives was 93%.
19Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show that any outcome (in their game that means any division of the dollar)
can be supported as an SPE using innitely nested punishment strategies as long as there are at least ve
players and the discount factor is su¢ ciently high. Li (2009) shows that even with three players, there is a
vast multiplicity of SPE.
20Baron and Kalai (1993) argue that stationarity is an attractive restriction since it is the simplestequi-
librium such that it requires the fewest computations by agents. We comment on limitations of stationarity
in Section 4.
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size principle, any proposal will be accepted with the minimal number of industries that
constitute a quorum of districts. In other words, the proposer forms a minimum winning
coalitionby choosing at most one coalition partner.
We assume that a legislator votes yes to a proposal if and only if the benets accruing
to her district from the current proposal is at least as high as the expected payo¤ it obtains
in case the proposal does not pass. In other words, we rule out weakly dominated strategies.
Suppose a legislator who represents a district that produces good i is recognized to make a
proposal and she proposes a tari¤ vector  i. Then, legislators who represent districts that
produce good j 6= i would say yes if and only if21
wj(
i)
1    wj(
s) +
vj
1   ,
or
wj( )  (1  )wj( s) + vj. (6)
The left-hand side of the above inequality indicates the per capita discounted total welfare a
district that produces good j obtains at the proposed prices, whereas the right-hand side is
the expected per capita discounted payo¤ if bargaining is carried over to the following period
(the status quo welfare for the current period and the continuation welfare thereafter).
The continuation values v1, v2 and v3 are endogenous, as they are determined by the equi-
librium tari¤ bill and the equilibrium probability of being in a winning coalition. However,
any recognized legislator will take them as given when designing the tari¤ bill.
3.1 Scenario 1: lim  ! 0
In the limit as  goes to 0, the constraint given in equation (6) becomes wj( )  wj( s).
Hence, the recognized industry-i representatives maximization problem can be stated as
max

wi( ) s.t. wj( )  wj( s). (7)
We will see that in this case di¤erent industries receive very di¤erent tari¤s in equilibrium,
even if they have the same economic characteristics, a feature in common with the case in
21Note that districts that accommodate the same industry are identical, so if this inequality holds for one,
then it also holds for all.
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which  approaches 1 analyzed below. However, there is no randomness in the choice of
coalition partners, and the proposer will always choose tari¤s to make itself better o¤ than
the status quo in both respects a contrast with the case as  approaches 1, as we shall see.
Since the legislators do not care about the future, the problem is static. If industry i
represents a majority in the Congress, i.e., ni
N
> 1
2
, there is no need for another industry to
support the current proposal. Therefore, the problem turns into the unconstrained maxi-
mization problem analyzed in Lemma 1. On the other hand, if industry i does not constitute
a majority in the Congress, it will choose as a coalition partner the industry that is easiest to
persuade, which turns out to be the industry j 6= i with the lowest size-adjusted status-quo
tari¤. The results can be summarized as follows. The proof of this proposition, and of all
subsequent propositions (with the exception of Proposition 3) is omitted here but can be
found in the working paper Celik, Karabay and McLaren (2011).
Proposition 1. Consider the limiting case as  approaches 0. A selected legislator rep-
resenting a district which produces good i proposes  i = Ui in the unique SSPE if in-
dustry i represents a majority in the Congress or if there is another industry l 6= i for
which wl(Ui)  wl( s). Otherwise, she chooses industry j as a coalition partner, where
 sj + Qj < 
s
k + Qk, j; k 6= i,22 and proposes tari¤s  i =
p
D   Qi,  j =   
p
D   Qj, and
 k =  Qk, where D = 12
h
2   2( sj +Qj) +
P
l=i;j;k (
s
l +Ql)
2
i
and D 2 [ 2
4
; 2]. The rst
proposal receives a majority vote, so the legislature adjourns after the rst session. If the
proposer has a majority (or the constraint in expression (7)) does not bind), it receives its
unconstrained maximum payo¤; otherwise, the proposer and coalition partner receive at least
their status quo payo¤s, and the industry left out of the coalition receives at most its status
quo payo¤.
As a result, when industry i has a majority in the Congress or when the constraint in
the maximization problem (7) does not bind when evaluated at  = Ui for one of the other
two industries, the industry-i representative can achieve its rst best. Otherwise, in order
22In the knife-edge case in which  sj + Qj = 
s
k + Qk, either industry j or industry k can be chosen as a
coalition partner.
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to obtain the support of the coalition partner, compared to its rst best, the proposer needs
to compromise by proposing a lower tari¤ for her own industry and a higher tari¤ for the
coalition industry. Nevertheless, controlling for the industry size, the tari¤ is the highest for
the industry represented by the proposer and lowest for the excluded industry.
The logic of coalition partner selection in the event that the proposer does not have a
majority can be understood as follows. Let us focus on the case when wl(Ui) < wl( s) for
both l = j; k, so the constraint the recognized industry-i legislator faces is binding. The
industry-i legislator strictly prefers industry j over industry k as a partner i¤  sj + Qj <
 sk + Qk. To obtain the support of the coalition partner, the proposed tari¤ vector must
provide the coalition partner a welfare that is at least as much as the coalition partners
the status quo welfare. We have also established that the optimal tari¤ for each industry
is a function of industry outputs. As a result, the resulting tari¤ vector will be a function
of the status quo tari¤s as well as industry outputs. Consider rst the thought experiment
that Qj = Qk. Since per capita status quo welfare is increasing in its own industrys status
quo tari¤, the industry i legislator will choose a coalition partner with a lower status quo
tari¤. Now, consider instead the case in which  sj = 
s
k. The industry i legislator will choose
the smaller industry as the coalition partner since the larger industry will generate fewer
imports, and so a given tari¤ would create a small tari¤ revenue. As a result, industry i
would receive less benet from a tari¤ on a large industry than on a small industry. As a
result, from industry is perspective, the best possible  i vector can be reached by choosing
the industry with the lower status quo tari¤ plus total output combination.
3.2 Scenario 2: lim  ! 1
In the limit as  goes to 1, the constraint given in equation (6) becomes wj( )  vj. It can be
shown that the inequality holds with equality,23 so the recognized industry-i representatives
23To be more precise, when wj( s) < vj (wj( s) > vj), the proposer o¤ers the coalition partner an ex post
payo¤ that is innitesimally below (above) vj . In either case, lim
!1
wj( ) = vj . The key di¤erence here with
Scenario 1 is that in Scenario 1 the coalition partner must compare the proposal with the status quo tari¤s,
and status quo tari¤s might happen to be very unattractive for a given coalition partner, while in Scenario
2 the status quo tari¤s are irrelevant and the coalition partner compares the proposal with the future payo¤
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maximization problem can be stated as
max

wi( ) s.t. wj( ) = vj. (8)
As dened before, vj is the welfare an individual with a stake in industry j expects at
the beginning of a period; hence, it is a weighted average of possible ex post payo¤s the
individual may obtain depending on the identity of the proposer. Since the ex post per
capita welfare function given in equation (3) is independent of status quo tari¤s, so are the
resulting equilibrium tari¤s and the resulting payo¤s found as a solution to equation (8).
Intuitively, when legislators are very patient, they place no weight on one-period gains (or
losses) regardless of how large they can be.
As mentioned earlier, a proposal will be accepted when majority support is obtained in
the Congress. As a result, there are two possible cases to be considered. We rst analyze the
situation when one of the manufacturing goods is su¢ ciently dispersed across the country
so that the districts producing it have a majority representation in the Congress (ni
N
> 1
2
).
We next turn attention to a more even distribution of industries in which no manufacturing
good has a majority representation in the Congress.
3.2.1 Case 1: n3
N
 n2
N
< 1
2
< n1
N
Here, since industry 1 is su¢ ciently large (i.e., it has the necessary number of seats in the
legislature) to set trade policy without the consent of other industries, when a legislator
representing industry 1 is recognized to make a proposal, she will propose  = U1. In
contrast, legislators representing either industry 2 or 3 need the support of industry 1 for
their proposals to be accepted. Each of them will optimally propose a tari¤ vector that
will be accepted by industry 1, because in case of rejection, even though they may obtain a
high status quo welfare for that period, they run the risk of getting w(U1) forever starting
from the following period. In contrast, by proposing a tari¤ vector that will be accepted by
industry 1, they can ensure an innite stream of a positive increment over w(U1) for their
districts. We summarize these observations in Proposition 2.
from continuing the bargaining.
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Proposition 2. When n1
N
> 1
2
, in the limit as  ! 1 any selected legislator proposes  = U1
in the unique SSPE. The rst proposal receives a majority vote, so the legislature adjourns
after the rst session. The equilibrium per capita continuation payo¤s are vi = wi(U1),
i = 1; 2; 3.24
We show that independent of the identity of the proposer, an agreement is always reached
in the rst period. We do so, for j = 2, 3, by comparing industry js payo¤ of proposing a
tari¤ vector that will be accepted by industry 1 to proposing one that will be rejected and
show that the former dominates the latter in the limit as  goes to 1.
Here, independent of the identity of the proposer, the majority industry obtains its
unconstrained maximization tari¤s. This is di¤erent than the previous scenario when  ! 0,
in which case the majority industry can obtain its unconstrained maximization tari¤s only
if it has the proposer power.
Moreover, in Case 1, the ex ante expected per capita payo¤s are equal to the ex post
per capita payo¤s (vi   wi( s) = wi   wi( s), 8i) since in all subgames legislators propose
 = U1 as  ! 1. Therefore, the analysis of the ex ante expected per capita welfare change
also follows our previous discussion following Lemma 1.
In short, in Case 1, the majority industry sets a positive tari¤ for itself and a negative
tari¤ for all other industries, and does so without any strategic constraint since it needs
no coalition partners or consent. Now we consider the more interesting case in which no
manufacturing industry can control the majority of seats in the legislature, so a legislator
who can propose a trade bill needs the support of the legislators representing at least one
other industry. To get their votes, she has to o¤er them a more favorable tari¤ compared
to the unconstrained case, which moves the nal outcome away from her rst-best. This is
what we analyze next.
24To be more precise, legislators representing industries 2 and 3 propose tari¤ vectors that approach
U1 in the limit as  goes to 1. For instance, an industry-2 representative proposes (1; 2; 3) =
(  Q1   " () ; Q2 + " () ; Q3), where lim
!1
" () = 0. Hence, continuation payo¤s also satisfy lim
!1
vi =
wi(
U1), 8i.
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3.2.2 Case 2: n3
N
 n2
N
 n1
N
 1
2
Here, we analyze the bargaining outcome when no industry is highly dispersed throughout
the economy. In this case, unlike in Case 1, in order to attain a simple majority of the votes,
a recognized industry-i legislator will have to compromise with at least one other industry,
say industry j thus leaving industry k out of the winning coalition. In order to obtain the
support of the industry-j legislators, the proposal should provide industry-j districts an ex
post welfare as high as the payo¤ they obtain if the bargaining is carried over to the next
period.
As in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), in Case 2, in an SSPE with  close to 1, generically
there is an equilibrium in which the proposer randomizes between the two other industries in
choosing a coalition partner. The proof is in the Appendix, but the crux of the idea can be
summarized as follows. In an SSPE, by denition, if proposer i ever chooses industry j with
probability 1, then (due to stationarity) she always will choose industry j with probability
1. But this means that industry j has enormous bargaining power, and consequently at any
given date, it will be less attractive for i to choose j than the other industry a contradiction.
Let s denote the probability that i will choose j, and hold constant the behavior of the other
players when they are proposers. A reduction in s lowers js continuation value, hence
bargaining power, and raises ks (i 6= k 6= j). Therefore, a critical value of s exists at which i
is indi¤erent between the two potential coalition partners, and this is the equilibrium value.
The proper proof must take into account boundary conditions as well as the fact that each
players probability over partners is endogenous, and it turns out that when all three players
probabilities are determined together, the equilibrium choice of probabilities is not unique,
although the payo¤s are. In the proof of Proposition 3, we rst show that when  ! 1 an
SSPE exists in which all legislators randomize between the other two industries. We then
prove that all SSPE are payo¤ equivalent. We now present the main result.
Proposition 3. When n1
N
 1
2
, in the limit as  ! 1 an SSPE exists in which a selected
legislator representing a district which produces good i proposes a tari¤  i = 23 Qi for the
good her district produces, a tari¤  j = 13 Qj for good j 6= i where j is selected randomly,
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and a tari¤  k =  Qk for the remaining good k. The rst proposal receives a majority
vote, so the legislature adjourns after the rst session. The ex post per capita payo¤s are
wi = wi(
s)+[(2
3
 Qi)  si ] 
52
9
 Pl=i;j;kh(sl+Ql)2i
2
for the industry the proposer represents,
wj = wj(
s) + [( 
3
  Qj)   sj ] 
52
9
 Pl=i;j;kh(sl+Ql)2i
2
for the industry the coalition partner
represents, wk = wk( s)+[ Qk   sk] 
52
9
 Pl=i;j;kh(sl+Ql)2i
2
for the remaining industry that
is outside the coalition.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note also that since  ! 1, ex ante expected per capita payo¤s for any industry i before
the proposer is determined are the same as the ex post payo¤s that industry would obtain if
it was chosen ex post as the coalition partner, which is given by vi = wi( s) + [( 3  Qi) 
 si ] 
52
9
 Pl=i;j;kh(sl+Ql)2i
2
for i 2 f1; 2; 3g.
Compared to Case 1, since the proposer needs the approval of one other industry, she
compromises by proposing a lower price for her own industry and a higher price for the
industry selected as the coalition partner. Below, we summarize the important properties of
this SSPE.
1. For given values of ,  si and Qi, 8i 2 f1; 2; 3g, the continuation payo¤ of any district
(or expected welfare change of any individual) is in between the highest and the lowest
continuation payo¤s obtained under Case 1. This makes sense since no industry is
dispersed enough to control the legislature single-handedly. Therefore, no industry is
either very strong or very weak. Thus, compared to Case 1, districts producing goods
2 and 3 have signicantly higher bargaining power, which, in turn, reduces the welfare
gain (may even result in welfare loss) districts that produce good 1 expect.
2. Per capita expected welfare change of each individual with a stake in industry i is
decreasing in  si and Qi and increasing in 
s
j 6=i and Qj 6=i as in Case 1 for exactly the
same reasons stated before. Moreover, depending on the values of  si , the ex ante
expected welfare change can be positive or negative for each industry, and it can be
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positive for all of them or negative for all of them.25 In contrast, in Case 1, industry
1 always obtains a welfare gain, and, independent of  s, there is always at least one
industry (must be either industry 2 or 3) which experiences a welfare loss.
3. The ranking of ex ante expected welfare gains for individuals with stakes in di¤erent
industries depends only on the values of  si and Qi, 8i 2 f1; 2; 3g and are independent
of industry dispersion (as long as ni
N
 1
2
for all i). This last point may be surprising:
an industry that dominates twice as many congressional districts as another receives
no net advantage from that fact (as long as it does not have a majority) even though
it will thereby have twice the probability that one of its representatives will be the
proposer. The reason comes from the dynamic nature of the bargaining. If industry
i has a large minority of the seats and thus a high probability of being the proposer,
it will gain from a high tari¤ if it is the proposer; and in any round where i is not
the proposer, the probability that it will become so in the next round is high. But
the other representatives will understand that industry i will therefore drive a tough
bargain if another industry is the proposer and chooses i as a coalition partner, so i will
rarely be chosen as a coalition partner. Industry is benet from being the proposer
with high probability is exactly cancelled out by its loss from being excluded from the
coalition with high probability when it is not the proposer.26
We should note that in the mixed strategy equilibria, randomization probabilities are not
unique although they all lead to the same set of payo¤s (and the same tari¤s conditional on
proposer and coalition partner), as stated in the following proposition.27
25For instance, when ( s1; 
s
2; 
s
3) = (   Q1;    Q2;    Q3), vi   wi( s) = 592 > 0 for all i. Similarly,
when ( s1; 
s
2; 
s
3) = (

3  Q1; 3  Q2; 3  Q3), vi   wi( s) =   192 < 0 for all i.
26This can be seen formally from the proof in the Appendix. Equation (10) shows how industry js ex
ante expected benet can be written in terms of probabilities of being the proposer (njN ) and the probability
of being the coalition partner
 
sij
ni
N + skj
nk
N

in addition to parameters. The remainder of the proof shows
that these probability terms cancel out, implying that any increase in njN and corresponding decrease in
ni
N
or nkN results in adjustment of sij and skj (the probability that j is picked by i or k) so that the probability
of being a coalition partner falls by 1= = 2 times as much as the increase in njN .
27The same multiplicity is also present in the standard symmetric Baron-Ferejohn game, see Celik and
Karabay (2013). Eraslan (2002) shows that all SSPE in the Baron-Ferejohn game are payo¤ equivalent when
the recognition probabilities are asymmetric.
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Proposition 4. All SSPE are payo¤-equivalent.
More broadly, Proposition 3 provides a number of characteristics for the equilibrium
that are strikingly di¤erent from characteristics of models without dynamic bargaining and
that may be useful in empirical work or in interpreting tari¤ history. First, note that the
equilibrium tari¤s are a function of economic fundamentals such as industry size Qi, but
they are also a function of political variables at the time of the congressional negotiation.
Note that after controlling for industry size, the tari¤ is highest for the industry represented
by the proposer and lowest for the excluded industry. The identity of the proposer is most
plausibly determined by the party with the majority in the Congress at the time of the tari¤
bill together with internal party competition for the leadership post; years later, even with
di¤erent leadership, the tari¤ structure will be determined partly by the political conditions
at the time of the tari¤ bill. Even conditional on the identity of the proposer, the tari¤
structure is a¤ected very much by the identity of the coalition partner, which receives a tari¤
premium, and this choice is necessarily randomized due to the mixed equilibrium required by
the dynamic logic of the model. In empirical work, one might imagine a number of proxies
for the proposer,including, in the US case, the chairmanship of the House Ways and Means
Committee or the Senate Finance committee; and one might think of using an ayevote on
the most recent tari¤ bill as a proxy for the theoretical construct of the coalition. Both
should have a signicant correlation with tari¤s.
Another way of looking at this is that the logic of congressional bargaining imposes dif-
ferent levels of protection for di¤erent industries even if all industries are ex ante identical.
Suppose that K1 = K2 = K3, n1 = n2 = n3, ps1 = p
s
2 = p
s
3, and p

1 = p

2 = p

3. Then most
other models would predict  1 =  2 =  3. Grossman and Helpman (2005) would predict
the same tari¤ for each industry within the same party. However, in our model, there would
be three separate levels of tari¤, even for observationally equivalent industries. Thus, the
empirical predictions of this model are quite di¤erent from those of other models.
Second, note that often representatives in the Congress in this model will vote for a
bill that they do not like, because with the dynamic bargaining, they are afraid that if the
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current bill does not pass, it will be replaced with something that they like even less. This
is a stark contrast not only with static models, but also with Scenario 1 of this model (in
which  approaches 0). This can be seen clearly by examining point 2 above. It is easy to
nd parameters such that the ex ante expected welfare change resulting from the bargaining
is negative for each industry. For example, suppose that the status quo is free trade in a
symmetric economy, so that  si = 0 and Qi =

3
, 8i 2 f1; 2; 3g. In this case, the ex ante
expected welfare change for each industry is negative (as can be seen from the equation
immediately after Proposition 3), since each industry knows that total welfare will fall as
tari¤s are introduced by the bargaining, but no-one knows who the ex post beneciary will
be. Consequently, the ex post welfare change for the coalition partner as a result of the
bargaining will be negative. This implies that the coalition partner will vote for a tari¤ bill
that lowers its utility relative to the status quo (in this case, a tari¤ bill that gives no tari¤
at all to its own products, while providing a positive tari¤ to the proposer and a negative
one to the excluded industry). This is because it fears the possibility of being the excluded
industry in the next round. It will support the bill as some members of the Congress from
manufacturing districts supported the tari¤-reducing Mills bill of 1888: with heavy hearts
(Tarbell, 1911, p. 165).
Indeed, it is easy to nd cases in which the proposer proposes and votes for a bill that
lowers its utility relative to the status quo, because it is aware that it might not be the
proposer in the next round and may face something worse. As an example, suppose that
the status quo tari¤s are close to the unconstrained optimum tari¤s Ui for industry i from
Lemma 1. In this case, industry i knows that if it is not the proposer, those tari¤s will be
changed and it will lose utility, so it will cut its losses and nd a tari¤ bill that its coalition
partner will agree to now. This is in the same spirit as when protectionist Republicans,
following a rousing speech in which President Cleveland made the case for free trade and the
political momentum was moving in that direction, struggled to come up with a strategy for
reducing tari¤s in a way that would blunt that momentum: Protection must be preserved.
If its operations were to be corrected, this must be done by its friends, not its enemies.
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(Tarbell, 1911, p. 154.)
Of course, this paradoxical outcome cannot arise if the status quo tari¤s were determined
endogenously by a past round of the bargaining in our model.28 In that case, the most
attractive possible status quo for the current proposer would be the outcome of the game
in the past in which that current proposer was then the proposer, so clearly she will not
propose anything that will make herself worse o¤. However, one can think of the status quo
tari¤s as the result of bargaining in an earlier era in which the parameters of the model were
di¤erent. For example, in the nineteenth century taxes were an important source of federal
revenues; the introduction of income taxes fundamentally changed the mapping from tari¤s
to outcomes, changing the game, and there would be no reason to expect previously enacted
tari¤s to be outcomes of the new game.
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss four points related to possible extensions of our model. The
rst one regards the number of industries. We have, for simplicity, considered only three
(manufacturing) industries. It is possible to generalize this to a larger number of industries.
The main intuition still holds. If one industry has majority representation, then that industry
gains the most. On the other hand, if none of the industries has a majority, then it is the
total production and status quo tari¤/subsidy,  si + Qi, that determine the gains for each
industry.29 For example, consider four industries with the following distribution: n1
N
= 0:4,
n2
N
= 0:3, n3
N
= 0:25, n4
N
= 0:05. In this example, industry 4 is too small to be valuable as a
partner in any coalition. However, when welfare changes from bargaining are considered, it
is still possible for industry 4 to benet more (or lose less) than others as long as  s4 +Q4 is
small enough and  si + Qis for i = 1; 2; 3 are large enough. Moreover, assuming symmetric
28We analyze this case in Appendix B (starting on page 57) of our working paper Celik, Karabay and
McLaren (2011). With status quo tari¤s restricted in this way, the equilibrium obtained in the limit as 
approaches 1 can be shown to hold exactly for a range  2 [~; 1), with ~ < 1.
29The underlying reasons are the same as in Section 3.1. Holding Qi constant across industries, raising an
industrys status-quo tari¤ raises its status-quo welfare, and holding status-quo tari¤s constant, increasing
an industrys Qi lowers its equilibrium tari¤ for any given coalition structure.
26
dispersion of industries, as the number of industries increases, the ex post tari¤s (as well as
the ex ante expected tari¤s) decrease.30
The second point is about the bargaining procedure. We have assumed that once an
agreement is reached, bargaining ends. Instead, assume that legislators bargain every period
and that if an agreement is reached in the previous period, it constitutes the status quo
for the current period. In the context of a three-player divide-the-dollar game, Kalandrakis
(2004) shows that there is a Markov equilibrium in which, irrespective of the initial status quo
payo¤s, every proposer is able to take the whole dollar (after a few iterations of the game).
The intuition is as follows. In every period, there will be a random proposer who chooses a
division that will be accepted by at least one other player. However, this division will always
have at least one player not receiving anything. Since this division constitutes the status quo
for the following period, the proposer in the next period selects the player with zero payo¤as
the coalition partner, and is thus able to take the whole dollar for herself. The same logic is
also at work in our model. In every period, one industry, say industry j, will be left out of the
winning coalition, getting a tari¤  j =  Qj, and having the lowest status quo payo¤ in the
following period. Thus, if a legislator representing industry i 6= j becomes the proposer in the
following period, she chooses industry j as her coalition partner, and is able to appropriate
higher gains. After some time in the game, whoever is the proposer (say industry i) will
propose Ui (unconstrained maximization tari¤s) and it will be accepted. This result is true
irrespective of the discount factor and the status quo tari¤s. However, although an industry
is able to achieve its rst-best when its representative becomes the proposer, it receives the
30Assume that there areM symmetrically dispersed manufacturing industries such that n1N = ::: =
nM
N . To
obtain majority, the support of M 12 other industries are required besides the industry the proposer belongs.
Then, the respective ex post tari¤s turn out to be:
 i =
M + 1
2M
  Qi, for the proposer industry
 j =
1
M
  Qj , for the M   1
2
partner industries
k =  Qk, for the M   1
2
remaining industries.
We can easily see that asM increases, the ex post tari¤s obtained by the proposer and the coalition partners
decrease. The ex ante expected tari¤s decrease as well since they are equal to what coalition partners get.
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worst possible payo¤ in the remaining scenarios. On average, it actually does worse relative
to when bargaining ends once an agreement is reached.31 Hence, if we add an initial stage to
our model where players can decide whether to play the game once or continuously, they will
choose to play once. When n1
N
> 1
2
, on the other hand, legislators will agree on U1 either
immediately if an industry-1 legislator is the rst proposer, or after a few periods otherwise.
In this case, the expected payo¤s remain the same as in our model.
The third point is about our focus on SSPE. This is of course not innocuous. For exam-
ple, it prevents consideration of optimal equilibria, in which members commit to behavior
conducive to maximizing their joint surplus by establishing subgame-perfect punishments for
any member who deviates from the optimum. Such an exercise would be of great interest,
and would stand in the same relation to this paper as Abreu (1986) stands in relation to
the original Cournot model. Such a major extension is beyond the scope of the current
paper, and at any rate one needs to understand the Cournot before exploring the extremal
equilibria. However, we can speculate about how such an extension would work out. Clearly,
for  su¢ ciently close to 0, the optimal equilibrium will be no di¤erent than the SSPE, since
equilibrium is the same as for a one-period model anyway. For  su¢ ciently close to 1, the
optimal equilibrium with symmetric industries will always be free trade. For intermediate
values of  where free trade is not attainable, we speculate that the optimal equilibrium
would still entail a proposer choosing a coalition partner and tari¤s that are highest for the
proposer and lowest for the outside industry, but that the tari¤s would be somewhat closer
to free trade than the tari¤s in the SSPE.
31Once the game converges to a stationary stage in which the proposer is able to achieve its rst-best,
industry is per-period continuation payo¤ becomes:
vi = wi(
s) + [(
ni
N
  Qi)   si ] 
2  Pl=i;j;k h( sl +Ql)2i
2
.
Since niN  12 , this is less than what industry i expects in our game:
vi = wi(
s) + [(

3
 Qi)   si ] 
52
9  
P
l=i;j;k
h
( sl +Ql)
2
i
2
.
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However, we believe that it would be a mistake to assume that when  is close enough to 1
that free trade is an equilibrium, that free trade will necessarily be the result. As Baron has
pointed out in another context,32 the strategies required to sustain the optimal equilibrium
in this type of model are not straightforward, and would require a great deal of coordination
to implement. Consider an equilibrium in which free trade is proposed by any proposer in
the rst period and accepted by a majority of members. This implies that if, say, i was
the proposer in period 0 and proposed a tari¤ vector that would make both i and j strictly
better o¤ than free trade, that j must choose to reject it. The only way that is possible is
if j expects favorable, preferential treatment in the subsequent round, so that its expected
payo¤ in period 1 exceeds the payo¤ it would have from the tari¤s proposed by i in period
0, as a reward for rejecting is o¤er. As a result, although with high  free trade is possible,
there is no guarantee that assembly members will successfully coordinate on that outcome,
particularly if the membership rotates over time and these complex, history-dependent rules
must be learned by each new member. Further, it is clear that in history, even though 
sometimes seems quite high in practice, legislatures have rarely coordinated on free trade,
to put it mildly recall the examples discussed in the introduction.
The fourth point is about the discount factor. For analytical convenience, we have con-
sidered the limiting cases in which  approaches 0 or 1, but the same broad patterns would
emerge with intermediate values of . In the context of a Baron-Ferejohn divide-the-dollar
game with asymmetric recognition probabilities (as in our paper), Eraslan (2002) shows that
an SSPE with fully mixed strategies does not exist when  is below a certain threshold.
This is also true in our game. When  < 1, depending on the values of
 
n1
N
; n2
N
; n3
N

and
( s1 +Q1; 
s
2 +Q2; 
s
3 +Q3), one or more industries may use pure strategies in choosing their
32The strategies required to support most distributions are very complex, however, and are composed
of innitely nested punishments that require members to calculate a strategy that species which action to
take in response to every possible deviation at every possible node in the game. Those strategies also require
members to have the capacity to keep track of every possible history of play. Yet in the actual play of the
game (i.e., along the equilibrium path), the rst proposal made receives a majority vote, and the game ends.
Consequently, the innitely nested punishments and the capacity to track every possible history are never
used. This raises the issue of whether members would actually devise innitely nested punishment strategies
and develop the capacity to track every conceivable history.Baron (1991, footnote 20).
29
coalition partners. For instance, when n1
N
= n2
N
= n3
N
= 1
3
, the industry with the highest
 si + Qi may never be chosen as a coalition partner if  is su¢ ciently low. Similarly, when
 s1 + Q1 = 
s
2 + Q2 = 
s
3 + Q3 =  , the industry with the highest
ni
N
may never be chosen
as a coalition partner if  lies below a threshold (but is still strictly positive).33 However, in
both cases our qualitative results would remain true. In particular, the ranking of welfare
gains remains the same; i.e., the industry with the lowest  si + Qi does the best while the
one with the highest  si + Qi does the worst. When 
s
1 + Q1 = 
s
2 + Q2 = 
s
3 + Q3 =  , all
industries are equally well o¤ unless one industry is su¢ ciently dispersed and  is su¢ ciently
low so that it is never chosen as a coalition partner. In this case, that industry does better
than others (namely, the benet of being the proposer with high probability outweighs the
loss from being excluded from the coalition).
5 Conclusion
We have developed a model of legislative trade policy-making in a setting of distributive
politics. A small open economy has many districts, each one of which is associated with a
particular industry. Thus, there is a conict among districts hinged on industry attachment.
Trade policy is determined collectively in the legislature as a result of bargaining among
legislators, each of whom seeks to serve the interests of the district she represents. The
legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and
Ferejohn (1989).
Our analysis has three characteristics that are distinct from existing studies; (1) In addi-
tion to the usual factors accounted for in empirical work, the resulting trade policy depends
on the identity of the agenda setter; (2) The congressional bargaining generally has an equi-
librium in mixed strategies due to its dynamic nature; and (3) Because of the uncertainty
about the future, strategic voting can lead a legislator to vote for a proposal that will make
33It can be shown that when  is in between
h

3 (1 
p
6
3 );

3 (1 +
p
6
3 )
i
, for any value of  2 (0; 1) there is
always randomization as long as 0  ni  12 , 8i. On the other hand, if  is outside of the interval dened
above, there will be randomization as long as each ni 2 [n; n], where n > 0 and n < 12 are endogenously
determined as a function of ( , , ).
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her district worse o¤ compared to the status quo.
In short, our model is dynamic and considers a parliamentary setting that stresses the im-
portance of institutional structure on trade policy formation. Furthermore, it is rich enough
to encompass the ndings of the existing literature as well as to incorporate new elements
to them by analyzing the e¤ects of dynamic, non-cooperative congressional bargaining.
A number of natural extensions suggest themselves; here we highlight two. First, it is
natural to consider how the distortionary tari¤-making observed in the present model is
constrained by the addition of a president with veto power and who represents the country
as a whole rather than the interests of any one industry.
Second, the logic of our model shows that legislators in some situations would be very
eager to nd a way to avoid the bargaining process that is described in this paper, and
might seek institutions that could take away their control over tari¤s in order to do so. One
example of an institution that might achieve this is Fast Track Authority, a legislative device
that has been used on several occasions by the US Congress to delegate some of its trade
policy power to the executive branch. We explore both this question and the e¤ect of veto
power in a companion paper (Celik, Karabay and McLaren, 2012).
A similar line of argument can also provide a rationale for constitutional rules that provide
a president with much of the agenda-setting power, as is the case in Brazil (Alston et al.,
2009), in order to avoid ine¢ cient congressional bargaining. Another possibility is that
this provides an unacknowledged but potentially important motivation for a customs union,
instead of a free-trade agreement, as a preferential trading bloc. For example, in approving
a customs union with the European Union (EU) in 1995, the Turkish parliament e¤ectively
delegated much of its tari¤-setting authority to the EU. A possible motive for such a move
is to avoid the sort of ine¢ cient bargaining that we study in this paper, but an exploration
of such issues is beyond the scope of this paper. This strategic element in choosing between
customs unions and free-trade agreements, together with the fast-track authority question
discussed above, show that our model can illuminate a number of issues in trade agreements
between countries, as well as in unilateral trade-policy setting.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. In what follows, we will refer to a legislator representing industry
i simply as legislator i. When legislator i is selected as the proposer and chooses industry
j 6= i as the coalition partner (and leaves industry k 6= i; j outside the winning coalition), we
denote the chosen tari¤s as  ij= ( iji ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ). Suppose legislator i is selected as the proposer
and chooses industry j 6= i as the partner. Legislator is maximization problem is
max
 iji ;
ij
j ;
ij
k
wi(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) s.t. wj(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) > (1  )wj( s) + vj,
where (using equation (4)), for l = i; j; k,
wl( i;  j;  k) = wl(
s) +
"
( l    sl ) 
1
2
X
m=i;j;k

(m +Qm)
2   ( sm +Qm)2
#
.
In the limit as  ! 1, the constraint can be rewritten as wj(iji ;  ijj ;  ijk ) > vj. Hence. the
Lagrangian can be expressed as
L( iji ;  ijj ;  ijk ) = wi( iji ;  ijj ;  ijk ) + ij(wj( iji ;  ijj ;  ijk )  vj),
where ij represents the cost to the proposing legislator i of obtaining the additional votes
of industry j to pass the proposal. The rst-order conditions, after simplication, are
 iji =

1 + ij
 Qi,  ijj =
ij
1 + ij
 Qj,  ijk =  Qk.
We rst show that, in an SSPE in which all proposers employ mixed strategies in choosing
their coalition partners, ij =  for all i 6= j. This follows from the following two observa-
tions. First, a selected legislator i would employ a mixed strategy only if the ex post payo¤
her district enjoys is the same whether she chooses industy j or k as a coalition partner:
wi(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) = wi(
ik
i ; 
ik
j ; 
ik
k )
,  iji  
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ijl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i =  iki   12 X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ikl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i .
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Using the equilibrium values of ( iji ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) and (
ik
i ; 
ik
j ; 
ik
k ), we have
2
1 + ij
  1
2
24

1 +
 
ij
2
2 
1 + ij
2
35 = 2
1 + ik
  1
2
24

1 +
 
ik
2
2 
1 + ik
2
35 .
It is easy to see that this equality holds only if ij = ik. Second, when industry j is chosen
as a coalition partner, it will be o¤ered an ex post welfare of vj regardless of the identity of
the proposer. Thus,
wj(
ij
i ; 
ij
j ; 
ij
k ) = wj(
kj
i ; 
kj
j ; 
kj
k )
,  ijj  
1
2
X
l=i;j;k
h 
 ijl +Ql
2   ( sl +Ql)2i =  kjj   12 X
l=i;j;k

 kjl +Ql
2
  ( sl +Ql)2

, 
ij2
1 + ij
  1
2
24

1 +
 
ij
2
2 
1 + ij
2
35 = kj2
1 + kj
  1
2
24

1 +
 
kj
2
2 
1 + kj
2
35 .
Again, this equality holds only if ij = kj. Together with the earlier observation, ij =
kj = ik, which implies that ij =  for all i 6= j, i; j = 1; 2; 3.
Next, we nd the equilibrium value of  in a mixed-strategy SSPE. We rst write down
the equilibrium ex post per capita welfare of a district that produces good j in three distinct
cases (when it is the proposer industry, when chosen as a partner industry, and when left
outside the winning coalition):
wproposerj = wj(
s) +
"
2
1 + 
  ( sj +Qj) 
1
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!#
,
wpartnerj = wj(
s) +
"
2
1 + 
  ( sj +Qj) 
1
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!#
,
woutsidej = wj(
s) +
"
 ( sj +Qj) 
1
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!#
.
We then express the equilibrium continuation welfare of a district on a per capita basis.
Let sij denote the probability that legislator i chooses industry j as a coalition partner.
Then, vj can be expressed as
vj =
nj
N
[sjiw
proposer
j + (1  sji)wproposerj ] +
ni
N
[sijw
partner
j + (1  sij)woutsidej ]
+
nk
N
[skjw
partner
j + (1  skj)woutsidej ]. (9)
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After simplication, this becomes
vj = wj(
s) +
2
1 + 
nj
N
+

sij
ni
N
+ skj
nk
N



 ( sj +Qj) 
1
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!
. (10)
The maximization problem implies wpartnerj = vj in equilibrium, and thus
3X
j=1
wpartnerj =
3X
j=1
vj.
Also note that
3X
j=1
i6=k 6=j

sij
ni
N
+ skj
nk
N

=

s12
n1
N
+ s32
n3
N

+

s13
n1
N
+ s23
n2
N

+

s21
n2
N
+ s31
n3
N

= (s12 + s13)
n1
N
+ (s21 + s23)
n2
N
+ (s31 + s32)
n3
N
=
n1 + n2 + n3
N
= 1.
The condition
3P
j=1
wpartnerj =
3P
j=1
vj can now be expressed as
32
1 + 
  
3X
j=1
 
 sj +Qj
  3
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!
=
2
1 + 
(1 + )  
3X
j=1
 
 sj +Qj
  3
2
  
1 + 2

2
(1 + )2
 
X
l=i;j;k
( sl +Ql)
2
!
,  = 1
2
.
So, the value of  can be determined without the knowledge of the randomization prob-
abilities. Plugging the equilibrium value of  into the tari¤s we found earlier gives
 iji =
2
3
 Qi;  ijj =

3
 Qj;  ijk =  Qk:
Plugging these into equation (4) gives the ex post per capita payo¤s stated in the proposition.
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The nal step of the proof is to show that there is an interior solution to the randomization
probabilities what we assumed at the beginning of the proof. Since vj = w
partner
j by the
maximization problem, we have
2
1 + 
nj
N
+

sij
ni
N
+ skj
nk
N



=
2
1 + 
, sij ni
N
+ skj
nk
N
= 1  2nj
N
.
For simplicity, let s12 = s1, s23 = s2 and s31 = s3. Then,
s1
n1
N
+(1 s3)n3
N
= 1 2n2
N
, s2
n2
N
+(1 s1)n1
N
= 1 2n3
N
, s3
n3
N
+(1 s2)n2
N
= 1 2n1
N
.
These equations are linearly dependent (two of them imply the third), so we lose one degree
of freedom. It is easy to check that, when n3
N
 n2
N
 n1
N
 1
2
, there is an interior solution in
which si 2 [0; 1] for all i. To see this, x s3 and express s1 and s2 in terms of s3:
s1 =
1  2n2
N
  (1  s3)n3N
n1
N
, s2 = 1 
1  2n1
N
  s3 n3N
n2
N
.
Any value of s3 2
h
0;
1 2n1
N
n3
N
i
yields s1; s2 2 [0; 1].
It is important to note that an industry may select its coalition partner with pure strategy.
However, there are limitations. Feasible solutions (in which si 2 [0; 1] for all i) are
(s1; s2; s3) =

1  2n2
N
  n3
N
n1
N
; 1  1  2
n1
N
n2
N
; 0

,
(s1; s2; s3) =

1  n1
N
  n2
N
n1
N
; 1;
1  2n1
N
n3
N

.
All three industries may use pure strategies only when n1
N
= n2
N
= n3
N
= 1
3
. In this case,
s1 = s2 = s3 in all SSPE, so (s1; s2; s3) = (1; 1; 1) and (s1; s2; s3) = (0; 0; 0) are both
possible. Similarly, when n1
N
= 1
2
, industries 2 and 3 may use pure strategies. In fact,
(s1; s2; s3) =
 
1  2n2
N
; 1; 0

is the unique SSPE in this case. Other than these two special
cases, only industry 2 or industry 3 may select its coalition partner with pure strategy.
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